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Summary 
The European Council and the Balkan Summit in 
Thessaloniki failed to deliver the necessary consistent 
implementation strategy for the European integration 
of the Balkans. At the same time, the euphoria related 
to the successful completion of Eastern enlargement 
seems to nurture the illusion that this role model of 
integration suffices to cope with the stability risks and 
the developmental deficits of the Balkans. In their 
latest analysis that looks beyond the political 
statements of Thessaloniki, the Bertelsmann 
Foundation and the Center for Applied Policy 
Research champion a rethinking and renewal of 
Balkan strategies. The arrangement should contain as 
many pre-accession instruments as practicable, as 
much stabilisation policy as needed and as much 
economic-development assistance as possible.  
Since 2000, the Bertelsmann Foundation and the 
Center for Applied Policy Research have studied 
potentials and limitations of a “European perspective” 
for the Western Balkans. Integration strategies were 
assessed and designed in cooperation with the 
Planning Staff of the German Foreign Ministry and 
leading think tanks from the region. On the basis of the 
conclusions from Thessaloniki, the following paper 
analyses the regional state of affairs and identifies 
strengths and weaknesses of current European Balkan 
policies.  
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The Balkans 2003 
With EU reform, migration, Iraq and transatlantic 
relations high on the political agenda, the Balkans were 
never expected to feature prominently during the 
deliberations of the heads of state at the Thessaloniki 
European Council on 19 and 20 June 2003. Thanks to 
the Greek Presidency and the geographic proximity of 
Europe’s troubled southeast, the Presidency’s 
Conclusions provide some clues on European strategies 
beyond Eastern enlargement 2004. The next day, the 
same city provided the right ambience for the EU-
Western Balkans Summit and a solemn re-confirmation 
of Europe’s commitment to the integration of the 
Western Balkans.  
Late last year, Athens declared Southeastern Europe a 
“key priority” of its EU Presidency. Meanwhile, the 
European rift brought to the fore by the Iraq war has 
spoiled the euphoria of the accession of the ten 
countries, celebrated in Athens on 16 April. The recent 
controversies concerning the more far-reaching 
proposals of the European Convention have sobered 
ambitions for a truly Common Foreign and Security 
Policy. Thus, half a year later, the Greek promise “to 
keep the Balkans high on the agenda” has become a tall 
call by itself. Yet, recent developments in the region 
and the projected consequences of Eastern enlargement 
require a determined rethinking and renewal of 
European strategies for Southeastern Europe. 
An optimist might argue that the region has not 
witnessed any new outbursts of ethnic violence and 
that the main state-building arrangements set up by 
Americans and Europeans have been upheld: the 1995 
Dayton Agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina, the 1999 
UNSC Res. 1244 for Kosovo, the 2001 Ohrid 
Agreement for Macedonia and the 2002 Belgrade 
Agreement for the FRY. Regional co-operation is 
picking up pace, e.g. in the form of a system of 
bilateral free-trade agreements initiated by the Stability 
Pact. The Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), 
moreover, has gained acceptance as the EU’s main 
strategy for the eventual integration of the Balkan 
region. Croatia’s application for “graduation” from the 
SAP to candidate status in February 2003 is a clear 
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indication of the reform stimulus provided by the 
European perspective.  
A pessimist would point to the assassination of Prime 
Minister Zoran Djindjic on 12 March 2003 as a sad 
reminder of both the all-pervasiveness of organised 
crime in the Balkans and the utter fragility of political 
consolidation. Numerous unresolved issues of nation 
and state building – the Kosovars striving for 
independence, the tug of war between Slavic and 
Albanian Macedonians, local Serbs’ unwillingness to 
come to terms with the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and the unforgotten idea for a referendum on 
Montenegrin independence – keep the European crisis 
managers on high alert. Croatia’s “graduation”, 
moreover, would make shambles of regional 
cooperation in the Western Balkans. Prospects that 
other countries will be able to sign a Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement (let alone, graduate from the 
SAP) in the near future are dim.  
The optimist and the pessimist would nevertheless 
agree that since the end of the Kosovo War in June 
1999, “Europe” has gradually replaced the USA as the 
key player in the region. The EU High Representative 
masterminded the new state of Serbia and Montenegro, 
while the EU has taken over police and peace-keeping 
missions in Bosnia and Macedonia respectively. The 
EU, the European Investment Bank, the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the 15 
member states contribute the lion’s share of assistance. 
The Stability Pact that includes the UN, the USA and 
Russia, has meanwhile become complementary to the 
EU’s Stabilisation and Association Process.  
In sum, the past half-year has underscored the 
necessity to reconfirm and enhance the European 
perspective for the Western Balkans as a whole and to 
concretise the integration roadmap for Croatia as a 
forerunner. The paradigm shift from stabilisation and 
reconstruction to regional co-operation and European 
integration has to be completed. On the other hand, 
reform progress and political normalisation in most of 
the region fail to meet the expectations – despite 
massive assistance and the ultimate incentive of the 
European perspective. For most states and state-like 
entities, stabilisation remains the prime agenda. Thus, 
the key question remains whether Europeanisation and 
stabilisation are either complementary or conflicting 
policy agendas.  
 
Thessaloniki, June 2003 
The Presidency Conclusions of the Thessaloniki 
European Council focus on the historical process of 
deepening and widening European integration. Beyond 
the accomplishments of Eastern enlargement, six key 
issues are addressed:  
1. Enhanced relations with Russia as a strategic 
partner in the fight against terrorism and in a world 
dominated by the USA as an increasingly 
unilateralist power;  
2. The possible opening of accession negotiations 
with Turkey in 2004; 
3. The 2003 concept of a Wider Europe which 
includes Europe’s new neighbours across the 
Mediterranean, the Middle East and the western 
CIS states of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and 
Moldova;  
4. The awkward situation of Cyprus, half a member 
of the EU; 
5. The accession of Romania and Bulgaria, planned 
for 2007 and facilitated by a special “roadmap”; 
and 
6. The enhancement of the SAP for the Western 
Balkans and the clarification of the procedure for a 
transfer from “aspiring” (SAP) to EU accession 
country. 
As the European Council did not go all the way in 
shifting the paradigm from stabilisation to European 
integration, the Presidency’s Conclusions summarily 
indicates adjustments within and around the 
Stabilisation and Association Process. The 
Presidency’s Conclusions turn a blind eye on non-EU 
institutions such as the Stability Pact and avoid 
referring to its heavy-handed interference in Serbia-
and-Montenegro state building. The Conclusions praise 
the policing and military missions in the region as a 
European achievement without reference to the 
underlying regional stability risks. Following the 
optimist’s logic, the Conclusions rather eulogise the 
Stabilisation and Association Process on the European 
side and the development of “regional ownership” on 
the part of the Balkan states. The heads of state 
underline their promise by “enhancing” or “enriching” 
the SAP in the form of a strengthening of the accession 
dimension, the copying of some accession instruments 
and some additional funding for social and economic 
cohesion in the region.  
In the summit declaration of 21 June, the “EU-Western 
Balkans Forum” as a political forum flanking the SAP 
and bilateral “European Partnerships” were announced. 
With its two-thronged objective of stimulating regional 
co-operation and strengthening the political dimension 
of EU-Western Balkans relations, the forum might 
further erode the Stability Pact’s role as a 
comprehensive strategy. (The Greek Presidency used 
the ill-omened phrase “reflect on the functioning of” 
for both the European Agency for Reconstruction and 
the Stability Pact.) Next to this biannual forum for 
multilateral dialogue, the European Partnership 
(modelled on the National Programmes for the 
Adoption of the Acquis in the accession process) 
highlights the bilateral “privileged relationship” and 
promises tailor-made benchmarks and incentives.   
The declaration of the heads of state at the EU-Western 
Balkans reads like a solemn profession of faith 
(“democracy, the rule of law, respect for human and 
minority rights, solidarity and a market economy”) and 
an equally solemn renunciation of evil practices 
(“extremism, terrorism and violence, be it ethnically, 
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politically or criminally motivated”). The overall 
impression is not quite one of partners working out a 
“shared agenda” and the best approaches to joint 
problems. 
Neither the Presidency’s Conclusions nor the EU-
Western Balkans Summit the next day were deemed 
the time and place for technicalities and procedural 
details. At least some of those had already been 
hammered out in the “The Western Balkans and 
European Integration” paper by the European 
Commission (May 2003), adopted with some 
modifications at the General Affairs Council in 
Luxembourg on 16 June as “The Thessaloniki Agenda 
for the Western Balkans. Moving Towards European 
Integration.” The Thessaloniki Agenda specified the 
promised “strengthening of the accession dimension of 
the SAP“: twinning programmes, access to TAIEX 
(Technical Assistance Information Exchange Office) and 
acquis monitoring as well as a tuning of CARDS and 
SAP assistance to the acquis.  
Compared to the highly critical and blunt assessment of 
progress made in the Balkans over the past few years 
(e.g. in the SAP annual report), the confirmation of the 
“European perspective” by the European Council was 
lukewarm at best: “The future of the Balkans is within 
the European Union”. The conditionalities were 
highlighted and some observers will have noticed that 
the term “European Integration Partnership” proposed 
by the Commission was changed in “European 
Partnerships” in the Thessaloniki Agenda. Two 
proposals made by regional leaders and international 
experts – and partly adopted by the Greek Presidency – 
were dropped in Thessaloniki: To transfer the SAP and 
the Western Balkans from DG External Relations to 
DG Enlargement and to provide additional funding for 
social and economic cohesion in the region. The 200 
million Euro of additional assistance promised for the 
next three years is not too impressive (compared to 
4.65 billion Euro in the 2000-2006 budget). The 
assessment of the effectiveness of CARDS assistance 
and SAP policy priorities seems not to have changed 
the strong focus on issues like good governance, the 
fight against organised crime and corruption, 
administrative capacity-building, border control and 
reform of the judiciary. In view of 20%-40% 
unemployment rates, the signing of the European 
Charter for Small Enterprises, however, remains a poor 
substitute for a policy for social and economic 
cohesion. The Thessaloniki Agenda seems to have 
identified “political will” as a largely independent 
variable as far as the structural causes of reforms 
deficits are concerned, but a dependent variable as far 
as European incentives and conditionalities are 
concerned.     
Probably the most tantalising statement in the 
Declaration is the acknowledgement that the SAP “will 
remain the framework for the European course of the 
Western Balkan countries, all the way to their future 
accession.” This suggests that countries like Croatia, 
even if they “graduate” from SAA to candidate status 
would stay within the SAP (and under DG External 
Relations!). Even if assistance and instruments similar 
to those of Eastern enlargement are made available for 
them, they would never join Romania and Bulgaria in 
the same process. Thus, the heterogeneous region 
could be kept together even if Croatia becomes a 
candidate country before Bosnia has even passed the 
feasibility study for an SAA. This awkward set-up 
again suggests that a real (long-term) trajectory 
towards European integration is not yet on the political 
agenda.            
In sum, the EU agenda after Thessaloniki did not fully 
follow through on the necessary far-reaching 
consequences of a strategy of European integration. At 
the same time, paradoxically, in dealing with the 
specific burdens and deficits of the region the EU relies 
too much on the European perspective alone.     
 
The European Agenda 
The actual accession of eight post-communist states, 
Malta and Cyprus in Mai 2004 by and large reinstates 
the traditional dividing line between “Europe” and the 
“Balkans”. Even though Romania, Bulgaria and 
Slovenia are to join NATO, the territory formerly 
under Ottoman rule will be de facto excluded from EU 
membership for the time being. The laggards of 
Eastern enlargement, Romania and Bulgaria, have set 
themselves the ambitious goal of joining the EU-25 in 
2007. The European Commission has promised its full 
support for this endeavour, but without watering down 
the conditions and 2007 merely remains a target date. 
Croatia expects to have a green light from Brussels by 
early 2004 and hopes to complete the adoption and 
implementation of the acquis no later than its two 
eastern neighbours (December 2004). For the other 
countries of the Western Balkans, the promise of the 
1999 Stability Pact “to draw the region closer to the 
perspective of full integration into EU structures” will 
remain a solemn promise for the time being. The Feira 
European Council (June 2002) offered a less Aesopian 
formula for the European perspective – “the fullest 
possible integration into the political and economic 
mainstream of Europe.” Yet, actual membership is 
generally estimated to be at least another ten years 
down the road. 
The crux of the matter is the fact that the perspective of 
EU integration is essential for the region’s future, but is 
not a panacea for all its structural problems. In fact, 
Eastern enlargement is a role model, but a success is 
not guaranteed for the next enlargement process. Due 
to structural historical legacies and ten years of warfare 
and ethnic conflict, the preconditions for post-
communist transition are substantially less favourable 
than they were in East-Central Europe. The long 
process towards EU integration opened with the 1999 
Stabilisation and Association Process. The integration 
process is partly driven by the urge to stabilise the 
region and coincides with (rather than succeeds) the 
main thrust of socio-economic transformation. By the 
time the Copenhagen Criteria were written down and 
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the first Europe Agreements were signed in the mid-
1990s, in East-Central Europe most macro-economic 
indicators were already pointing upwards again, 
towards sustainable development. In the Western 
Balkans today, unemployment, inflation and de-
industrialisation have reached levels Estonia, Slovakia 
or Poland have never ever witnessed. Thus, the 
challenges of stabilisation, transformation and 
integration have to be handled all at the same time and 
the EU consequently finds itself in multiple roles: 
initiator, driving force, assessor, mediator and final 
destination.  
In recent months, the EU took heart and tackled two of 
the above dilemmas head-on. Although neither 
initiative directly concerned the Western Balkans, there 
are lessons to be learnt from both of them for future 
EU Balkan strategies. In March 2003, the European 
Commission drafted a strategy for relations with its 
future neighbours to the East and to the South. These 
countries from Morocco to Israel and from Moldova to 
Russia were made part of a “Wider Europe”, but the 
new category of “neighbours” implies that EU 
accession is not an option, no matter in what timeframe 
or in what stages. Once this “golden carrot” of EU 
membership is off the table, the EU hopes to offer its 
neighbours attractive special, privileged relations in the 
economic sphere and concerning the “four freedoms.” 
It remains to be seen when the governments of the 
neighbours will be ready to relinquish the mantra of an 
illusory EU perspective and settle for privileged 
relations conditional on concrete reform efforts. It also 
remains to be seen whether the EU and its soon 25 
members will be able to all adhere to this policy 
principle. Evidently, the communication of the 
Commission is first and foremost a message to Ukraine 
and Moldova, two weak states characterised by much 
debate on EU perspective without any reform progress 
towards democracy or a functioning market economy 
to match this rhetoric. The inclusion of the African 
neighbours across the Mediterranean has a certain 
consistency and charm, but is rooted in lobbying by 
Southeuropean EU members. It is equally logic and 
consistent that the Western Balkans are not mentioned 
in the Wider Europe communication, although Albania 
and Moldova may have more in common than Israel 
and Belarus. The idea of a “silver carrot” may be 
relevant for the Balkans and the long interlude between 
EU perspective and EU membership. Enhanced 
bilateral relations and functional cooperation with the 
EU outside the logic and dynamics of the enlargement 
process can be mutually advantageous. It still can be 
conditional on reform progress and may be used to 
improve local preconditions for development without, 
however, further eroding regional ownership. 
A second EU initiative that went equally unnoticed in 
the media concerned the roadmap for Romania and 
Bulgaria, prepared for the Copenhagen European 
Council (Dec. 2002). Status matters: the new EU 
members are likely to attract more foreign investment 
and will have access to the various EU funds for social 
and economic cohesion. Thus, to avoid that the 
decision to postpone the accession of Romania and 
Bulgaria will exacerbate the gap between the ten 
acceding states and the two latecomers, the EU has 
come up with the roadmaps. Romania and Bulgaria 
will receive additional pre-accession assistance to 
match their reform efforts to become members in 2007.  
(In Thessaloniki the target date of 2007 was 
confirmed.) Well-defined specific benchmarks in the 
roadmap are linked to a phase increase of assistance (to 
+40% by 2006). Additionally, Romania and Bulgaria 
will in many respects be treated as if they already were 
members and be allowed to participate in a number of 
Community programmes, agencies and committees. By 
making the partitions between different statuses 
somewhat permeable, the EU intends to meet the 
counterproductive consequences of its conditionality – 
widening gaps and increasing disparities. The same 
logic could be applied to the divide between the 12 
acceding and accession countries, on the one hand, and 
the 5 associated countries, on the other hand. 
 
Key Recommendations 
Assessing the “Thessaloniki Agenda” and the outcome 
of the “double” summit in Thessaloniki, it seems that 
the European “grand design” for the Balkans is far 
from complete. The EU perspective certainly is the 
ultimate and dominant agenda for the region. It would 
be a fallacy though to expect Southeastern enlargement 
to be similar to Eastern enlargement. The key 
challenge the region poses is being the last case of EU 
and the first case of “Wider Europe” at the same time. 
Thus, one set of recommendations concerns the 
European agenda; another set the specifics of 
macroeconomic deficits in an instable region; and a last 
set of recommendations addresses functional 
cooperation that is not integration-driven. 
European Agenda - Thessaloniki will make the 
Stabilisation and Association Process more similar to 
the EU accession process by initiating the “European 
Partnerships” and by opening some pre-accession 
instruments for the “associated” countries of the 
Western Balkans. Yet, the two processes will remain 
formally separated, even though commissioner Patten 
responsible for the SAP systematically hires redundant 
experts from DG Enlargement, now dealing with 
Romania and Bulgaria only. The solemn restating of 
the promise of an “EU perspective” in Thessaloniki 
will fail to dissipate local misgivings about 
“enlargement fatigue” in an EU-25 and other 
imponderabilities in current world politics. The first 
European Council of the twenty-five in June 2004 
offers a similarly appropriate setting for a far more 
powerful symbolic act – the transfer of the SAP from 
DG External Relations to DG Enlargement. The 
distinction between “associated” and candidate 
countries would remain, but the “mirroring” of 
enlargement instruments and expertise could be 
arranged far more effectively. 
A true European perspective also requires the 
ratification and full implementation of the signed 
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Stabilisation and Association Agreements as well as 
entry and exit procedures. Exit procedures would 
define concrete targets and trajectories for countries 
that are moving from SAP to candidate status. Entry 
procedures would provide an initial SAP stage with 
lower conditions (and benefits) that would allow 
laggards like Bosnia-Herzegovina or Kosovo to enter 
the process. Rather than to develop an intermediate 
“acquis light” for the SAP countries, depending on 
reform progress in specific policy fields, acquis 
screening and expertise ought to be available in the 
SAP too.   
Macroeconomic Deficits and Regional Instability – 
The priorities and resources of the SAP in its current 
form, however, are typically defined by issues like 
administrative capacity-building, reform of the 
judiciary, border control and the fight against organised 
crime and corruption. Shortcomings in these policy 
fields predominate in the latest Progress Reports on 
Latvia and Slovakia as well as in the recent annual 
reports on Macedonia and Albania. The unsustainable 
macroeconomic deficits ranging from aid dependency, 
high unemployment and low direct foreign investment 
are not addressed with similar vigour and resources. 
Most of the SAP benefits are in the areas of trade and 
investment and cannot be used to the full without 
macroeconomic stability. Substantial commitments for 
social and economic cohesion are needed as a basis for 
both long-term stabilisation and a true European 
perspective. EU harmonisation policies have been 
highly effective and successful for the emerging 
market economies of East-Central Europe, but may 
distort reform processes in less developed weak states 
in Southeastern Europe. Managing the transition 
towards sustainable economic growth is the key 
challenge of today. A critical assessment of the 
effectiveness of the different SAP and CARDS 
instruments is more than welcomed: The states of the 
region have failed to allocate substantial parts of the 
available resources in recent years, whereas the key 
problem of programmes to create employment so far 
had a low priority and received minimal funding. A 
managed introduction of the four freedoms and most of 
all the liberalisation of the visa regime within the 
Balkan enclave as well as with the EU could be a 
major asset (and incentive). Aid dependency as a 
permanent risk could be countered by co-financing and 
national programmes for the use of budget resources 
and EU funding with well-defined objectives and 
allocations.     
Functional Cooperation – The distinction between 
countries with and without an EU perspective and the 
enclave character of the small Balkan region 
necessitate forms of mutually beneficial cooperation 
outside and beyond the framework of EU integration. 
In a range of policy fields, the nexus between EU 
conditionality and benefits seems irrelevant or even 
counterproductive. Pan-European transport corridors, 
energy networks or environmental issues and for 
instance the inclusion of the Western Balkans in EU 
educational programmes are prime examples of options 
for functional cooperation that is not integration-
driven. The same applies to the Thessaloniki proposals 
to improve parliamentary cooperation as well as 
political cooperation by inviting the countries of the 
Western Balkans to associate themselves with EU 
declarations, Common Positions of Common Foreign 
and Security Policy. In the Thessaloniki Agenda 
functional cooperation is either defined as cooperation 
within the region or concerns issues of political 
representation like CFSP or inter-parliamentary 
dialogue. In a multilayered Europe, levels of 
cooperation for the Balkans (or for new neighbours 
even) could be introduced that are not EU-focussed or 
acquis-driven – not as a confession of powerlessness 
but as a way to improve functional cooperation. 
 
In Sum 
In sum, the pessimists seem to have won the day in 
Thessaloniki. Two and a half years have passed since 
the first EU-Western Balkans Summit in Zagreb – two 
and a half years without Milosevic – but the Balkans’ 
track record in terms of stability and reform is 
disappointing from the perspective of EU leaders. 
Within the EU, enlargement sceptics, net contributors 
and the architects of the current architecture of SAP 
and Stability Pact seem to have successfully resisted 
Greek impulses to rethink and renew European 
strategies for the Balkans. 
In a weighing of the pros and cons of the Thessaloniki 
Agenda, the cons concern the absence of a concept for 
social and economic cohesion and against increasing 
disparities between Western Balkans and the accession 
states, the missed opportunity to transfer SAP to DG 
Enlargement, the prioritisation of advanced governance 
issues and the push for intra-regional cooperation 
rather than functional cooperation in a broader 
European framework. The pros of Thessaloniki are the 
introduction of benchmarking, interim incentives in the 
SAP (visa regimes, customs union), a regular political 
dialogue, the enriching of the SAA’s accession 
dimension as well as some tentative elements of non-
acquis driven cooperation. All in all, a Balkanic 
outcome.    
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DOCUMENTS 
Thessaloniki European Council (19 and 20 
June 2003) Presidency Conclusions  
WESTERN BALKANS 
40.  The European Council, recalling its conclusions in 
Copenhagen (December 2002) and Brussels (March 
2003), reiterated its determination to fully and 
effectively support the European perspective of the 
Western Balkan countries, which will become an 
integral part of the EU, once they meet the established 
criteria. 
41.  It endorsed the Council conclusions of 16 June on 
the Western Balkans, including the annex "The 
Thessaloniki Agenda for the Western Balkans: moving 
towards European integration", which aims at further 
strengthening the privileged relations between the EU 
and the Western Balkans, also drawing from the 
enlargement experience. The Union's thus enriched 
Stabilisation and Association Process will remain the 
framework for the European course of the Western 
Balkan countries all the way to their future accession. 
42.  The European Council looked forward to the EU-
Western Balkans Summit meeting of 21 June as a 
major opportunity for the two parties to push ahead 
with their common goals. The Declaration that will be 
adopted there, together with the Thessaloniki Agenda, 
should provide a sound basis for directing the reform 
efforts of the Western Balkan countries in coming 
closer to the Union, and the enhanced EU support to 
their endeavours. 
43.  The European Council also endorsed the Council 
Conclusions on the 2003 Annual Review of the 
Stabilisation and Association Process. 
 
EU-Western Balkans Summit 
(Thessaloniki, 21 June 2003) Declaration 
We the Heads of State or Government of the member 
States of the European Union, the acceding and 
candidate states, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Serbia and Montenegro, as potential candidates, and 
the President of the European Commission, in the 
presence of the President of the European Parliament, 
the Secretary General of the Council/High 
Representative, the Special Representative of the UN 
Secretary General in Kosovo, the Special Co-ordinator 
of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe and the 
High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
meeting in Thessaloniki, agreed today on the 
following: 
1. We all share the values of democracy, the rule of 
law, respect for human and minority rights, solidarity 
and a market economy, fully aware that they constitute 
the very foundations of the European Union. Respect 
of international law, inviolability of international 
borders, peaceful resolution of conflicts and regional 
co-operation are principles of the highest importance, 
to which we are all committed. We vigorously 
condemn extremism, terrorism and violence, be it 
ethnically, politically or criminally motivated. 
2. The EU reiterates its unequivocal support to the 
European perspective of the Western Balkan countries. 
The future of the Balkans is within the European 
Union. The ongoing enlargement and the signing of the 
Treaty of Athens in April 2003 inspire and encourage 
the countries of the Western Balkans to follow the 
same successful path. Preparation for integration into 
European structures and ultimate membership into the 
European Union, through adoption of European 
standards, is now the big challenge ahead. The 
Croatian application for EU membership is currently 
under examination by the Commission. The speed of 
movement ahead lies in the hands of the countries of 
the region. 
The countries of the region fully share the objectives of 
economic and political union and look forward to 
joining a EU that is stronger in the pursuit of its 
essential objectives and more present in the world. 
3. The endorsement yesterday by the European Council 
of ‘The Thessaloniki agenda for the Western Balkans: 
Moving towards European Integration’ represents a 
new important step in the privileged relationship 
between the EU and the Western Balkans. Its content 
shall be considered as our shared agenda, and we all 
commit to its implementation. The countries of the 
region will focus their efforts on meeting the 
recommendations this agenda refers to. 
4. We acknowledge that the Stabilisation and 
Association process (SAP) will remain the framework 
for the European course of the Western Balkan 
countries, all the way to their future accession. The 
process and the prospects it offers serve as the anchor 
for reform in the Western Balkans, in the same way the 
accession process has done in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Progress of each country towards the EU will 
depend on its own merits in meeting the Copenhagen 
criteria and the conditions set for the SAP and 
confirmed in the final declaration of the November 
2000 Zagreb summit. The Western Balkan countries 
highly value the annual review mechanism of the SAP, 
based on the Commission’s reports, and commit 
themselves to implement its recommendations. 
The Western Balkan countries welcome the decisions 
by the EU to strengthen its Stabilisation and 
Association policy towards the region and to enrich it 
with elements from the experience of enlargement. 
They welcome in particular the launching of the 
European Partnerships, as well as the decisions for 
enhanced co-operation in the areas of political dialogue 
and the Common Foreign and Security Policy, 
parliamentary co-operation, support for institution 
building, opening of Community programmes. They 
take note of the ongoing discussions for an increase in 
the budgeted Community financial support to the 
region through the CARDS programme. 
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5. We support the full implementation of Resolution 
1244 of the UN Security Council on Kosovo and the 
‘standards before status’ policy of UNMIK; we remain 
committed to the Dayton/Paris Agreements and we 
encourage full implementation of the Ohrid and 
Belgrade agreements. The EU and the SAP countries 
fully support the International Criminal Court, 
recalling relevant EU decisions. The Western Balkan 
countries pledge full and unequivocal co-operation 
with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia. Its work, on all open issues, including the 
transfer to The Hague of all remaining indictees, 
should be allowed to progress without delays. 
Providing justice for war crimes is a legal, political and 
moral imperative to which we are all committed. 
Sustainable return of refugees and internally displaced 
persons is critical for ethnic reconciliation and an index 
of democratic maturity; it remains high on our priority 
agenda. We stress the role of education, culture and 
youth in promoting tolerance, ensuring ethnic and 
religious coexistence and shaping modern democratic 
societies. 
Fragmentation and divisions along ethnic lines are 
incompatible with the European perspective, which 
should act as a catalyst for addressing problems in the 
region. 
The recent launching of the EU police Mission in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and of the operation 
"Concordia" in the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia are tangible proofs of the EU’s 
commitment to the region. 
While the EU is strengthening its commitment in 
Southeast Europe, notably in police and security 
operations, continued engagement of other 
international actors is necessary. We all highly value 
the close co-operation between the EU and the US and 
NATO in the region, within the framework of UN 
Resolutions, as well as the role of other international 
organisations and financial institutions operating in the 
area. We encourage close co-ordination of their 
activities. 
6. Organised crime and corruption is a real obstacle to 
democratic stability, the rule of law, economic 
development and development of civil society in the 
region and is a source of grave concern to the EU. 
Combating it constitutes a major priority. The SAP 
countries commit themselves to define and implement 
the measures foreseen in the follow up process to the 
London conference of November 2002 and described 
in the Thessaloniki Agenda. Particular attention will be 
given in combating trafficking in human beings. The 
countries of the region also commit to concrete 
measures, in accordance with the Thessaloniki Agenda 
and the documents of the Ohrid May 2003 conference, 
respectively, in order to cope effectively with illegal 
immigration and improving border security and 
management, aiming at achieving European standards. 
7. We acknowledge the importance the peoples of the 
Western Balkans attach to the perspective of 
liberalisation of the EU’s visa regime towards them. 
We recognise that progress is dependent on 
implementing major reforms in areas such as the 
strengthening of the rule of law, combating organised 
crime, corruption and illegal migration, and 
strengthening administrative capacity in border control 
and security of documents. The Western Balkan 
countries welcome the intention of the Commission to 
hold discussions, within the framework of the 
Stabilisation and Association Process, with each of 
them, regarding the requirements for how to take these 
issues forward in concrete terms. 
8. Economic prosperity is essential to long term 
stability and democracy in the region. Persistent efforts 
and structural reforms are required to establish 
functioning market economies and to achieve 
sustainable development and to ensure employment. 
We recognise the importance of developing modern 
networks and infrastructures in energy, transport and 
telecommunications in the region, consistent with the 
Trans-European Networks. We encourage further 
mobilisation of international support in these areas, 
notably through the European Investment Bank and 
other International Financial Institutions, and private 
investment. 
The SAP countries welcome the decisions by the EU to 
consider further measures for enhancing its trade with 
them, to extend the Internal Energy Market to the 
region as a whole and to establish a regular economic 
dialogue with each country of the region. 
Considering that small and medium-sized enterprises 
are a key source of jobs, innovation and wealth and are 
essential for the functioning of competitive market 
economies, the SAP countries hereby commit to the 
policy principles enshrined in the European Charter for 
Small Enterprises, as well as to participate in its 
implementation. 
9. We reiterate that rapprochement with the EU will go 
hand in hand with the development of regional co-
operation. The countries of the Western Balkans and, 
where applicable, other regional participant countries, 
commit to promote concrete objectives and initiatives, 
along the lines prescribed by the Thessaloniki Agenda, 
in the areas of regional free trade, visa-free movement 
within the region, collection of small arms, creation of 
regional markets for electricity and gas, development 
of transport, energy and telecommunication 
infrastructures, environment and water management, 
research technology and development, cross-border co-
operation and parliamentary co-operation. 
We reconfirm our support to the Stability Pact for 
South-Eastern Europe in its complementary role to the 
Stabilisation and Association Process and in 
implementing its agreed core objectives. We invite it to 
focus in particular on the tasks suggested in the 
Thessaloniki Agenda. We support regional co-
operation initiatives such as the South-East European 
Co-operation Process (SEECP), the Adriatic-Ionian 
Initiative, and the Central European Initiative. We 
encourage further co-operation between the European 
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Commission, the Stability Pact and the SEECP, which 
is gradually becoming the voice of the region. 
10. Since our Zagreb meeting in November 2000, 
considerable progress was made towards stability, 
democracy and economic recovery in all countries of 
the Western Balkans, as well as in regional co-
operation and good neighbourly relations between 
them, to the benefit of their peoples and of Europe as a 
whole. All the countries of the region have also made 
good progress in advancing towards the EU. A 
comparison with three years ago reveals the road that 
has been covered. At the same time, the Western 
Balkan countries, aware that there is much and hard 
work ahead, commit themselves to intensify the pace 
of reforms. The European Union pledges full support 
to their endeavours. 
We have agreed to meet periodically at our level, 
within the framework of a EU-Western Balkan forum, 
in order to discuss issues of common concern, to 
review progress of the countries of the region in their 
road to Europe, and to exchange views on major 
developments in the EU. Annual meetings of foreign 
ministers and ministers responsible for Justice and 
Home Affairs will be held as appropriate. Acceding 
and candidate countries will be fully involved. We 
welcome the intention of the incoming EU Italian 
Presidency to organise the first meetings of this kind, 
by the end of the year. Other ministers can also meet 
when appropriate. 
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